Introduction
Incentives and Risk Sharing in a Stock Market Equilibrium
Economists have long been ambivalent on the merits of the stock market. On the one hand, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which is the basis for the modern theory of¯nance, emphasizes the merit of the stock market for diversifying the idiosyncratic risks and sharing the aggregate risks of productive activity. On the other hand, the traditional view of the classical economists, revived in modern times by Berle and Means (1932) , Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the ensuing agency-cost literature, emphasized the negative e®ect on incentives of the separation of ownership and control implied by the corporate form of ownership. This paper provides a framework for reconciling these two perspectives and shows the circumstances under which the stock market can provide an optimal trade-o® between the bene¯cial e®ects of risk sharing and the distortive e®ects on incentives.
To study the e±ciency properties of the stock market it is natural to use the framework of general equilibrium. We adopt the simplest model which permits the simultaneous analysis of production, risk-sharing and¯nancing decisions|namely the two-period general equilibrium model of Diamond (1967) . In the spirit of Knight (1921) we model the¯rm as an entity arising from the organizational ability, foresight and initiative of an entrepreneur. The activity of a¯rm consists in combining entrepreneurial e®ort and physical input (the value of capital and non-managerial labor) at an initial date: this gives rise to a random pro¯t stream at the next date. In addition to entrepreneurs there is another class of agents which we call investors: they have initial wealth at date 0 but no productive opportunities. In the spirit of the principal-agent literature, we assume that the e®ort of entrepreneurs is not observable and that the risks to which¯rms are exposed are su±ciently complex to make the writing and enforcement of contracts contingent on states unfeasible (states of nature are unveri¯able). Under these assumptions, markets for channeling capital from investors to¯rms and for sharing risks must either be non-contingent or based on the realized outputs of¯rms. In this paper we concentrate on the simplest (linear) contracts: defaultfree debt and equity. Entrepreneurs can thus obtain funds for¯nancing their capital investment by drawing on their own initial wealth, by selling shares of their¯rms or by issuing debt; they can diversify their risks by buying shares of other¯rms. Since arrangements for¯nancing typically have to be made before production can take place, we assume that the trades on the debt and equity markets are made before the entrepreneurs choose the level of e®ort to invest in their¯rms.
Under these circumstances trade on the¯nancial markets will in°uence the e®ort that entrepreneurs invest in their¯rms. If an entrepreneur¯nances his venture by selling most of the shares of his¯rm, he will not have much incentive to invest e®ort in his¯rm, since most of the payo® from his e®ort goes directly to outside shareholders. On the other hand if the¯nancing is done principally by debt, then typically a high level of e®ort will be required to ensure that the¯rm does not go bankrupt. The e®ect on incentives is not however the only consequence of the choice of capital structure: for the choice of debt and equity also determines the way the productive risks of the economy are shared. To take an extreme example, if equity were not traded at all, and if all nancing were made by debt, then no share of the productive risks would be carried by investors | the full burden would fall on the entrepreneurs, who would have undiversi¯ed and leveraged pro¯t streams.
The trade-o® between incentives and risk sharing is the problem that is studied in the principalagent literature: the di®erence is that in the setting that we consider there is no principal who directly designs a contract to induce agents (entrepreneurs) to behave in an optimal way: whatever incentive schemes there are must somehow be created by the markets. It is thus natural to ask whether the stock and bond markets can create incentive schemes which lead to a socially optimal balance between incentives and risk sharing.
The moral hazard problem posed by the nonobservability of entrepreneurial e®ort only arises when equity is sold, for then the bene¯t of an entrepreneur's e®ort is shared between the entrepreneur and the outside shareholders, while the cost is born solely by the entrepreneur. If a price system is to provide appropriate incentives, then it must discourage entrepreneurs from selling too much equity of their¯rms. Intuitively this will only happen if entrepreneurs are aware that the market will \punish" them by a low price for their¯rms' shares, if they attempt to sell too much of their equity.
In Section 2 we propose a concept of equilibrium in which markets play such a disciplining role.
It is based on two ideas:¯rst, it assumes that investors are well informed | they can observe all the¯nancial decisions of entrepreneurs | and use this information to deduce the e®ort that entrepreneurs will exert. Second, it assumes that entrepreneurs are aware of this fact: this is formalized by the concept of price perceptions. To decide whether an investment-¯nancing plan is optimal, an entrepreneur needs to evaluate what would happen if he were to change this plan: his price perceptions describe how he perceives that the price of his equity would react to any such change of plan. The price perceptions are assumed to be rational (i.e. entrepreneurs think that investors will correctly deduce from their investment-¯nancing decision what their e®ort and the 1. Introduction associated output of their¯rm will be) and competitive (an entrepreneur cannot a®ect the span of the¯nancial markets and thus the risk premium that investors require to invest in the risky income stream that he sells). Putting these ideas together leads to the concept of a stock market equilibrium with rational, competitive price perceptions (an RCPP equilibrium).
This concept of equilibrium describes markets functioning at their best: does it su±ce to induce a socially optimal outcome? First best optimality is clearly too demanding a criterion to use in this setting: what is needed is a extension of the concept of constrained e±ciency introduced by Diamond (1967) which respects both the limited available set of¯nancial securities and the incentive constraints imposed by the nonobservability of e®ort. The associated constrained social optimum problem is in fact equivalent to a principal-agent problem. In Section 3 we show that an RCPP equilibrium is constrained e±cient: markets can thus be thought of as designing an incentive contract which is the solution of a principal-agent problem. More precisely, it is the rational price perceptions which provide the incentive schemes (nonlinear prices) that induce entrepreneurs to choose an optimal capital structure.
The model that we study makes it possible to integrate two branches of the literature: the classical literature on portfolio choice and security pricing (the standard general equilibrium model of¯nance) and the literature on agency costs and their relation to capital structure, which following Jensen-Meckling (1976) , have been studied in partial equilibrium models. Having a model with incentives which contains the classical risk-sharing model as a special case, permits one to study how the predictions of the standard model are modi¯ed by the presence of incentive e®ects. In Section 4 we give examples of RCPP-equilibria and compare the resulting capital structure and security prices with those of the standard¯nance model: we¯nd that in an RCPP equilibrium diversi¯cation is less extensive for entrepreneurs, since incentive considerations induce them to retain a larger share of their own¯rm and a smaller share of the equity of other¯rms than would be required solely on the basis of risk diversi¯cation; furthermore, incentives induce entrepreneurs to make much more extensive use of debt than would be predicted by the standard model. These di®erences translate into higher interest rates and lower risk premia on the risky securities.
Related Literature. The study of the way ownership structure in business enterprise a®ects incentives has a long tradition in economics. The classical economists were uncompromisingly in favor of sole proprietorship, arguing that shared ownership has a negative e®ect on incentives Cheung (1969) and Stiglitz (1974) : for a more recent discussion of shared ownership (and the stock market) versus sole proprietorship see Hammond (1993) . The paper by Stiglitz was an early contribution to the literature on the principal-agent problem which subsequently gave rise to an extensive literature (see for example Sappington (1991) for a survey). Although our paper is not set up as a principal-agent problem, as we pointed out above the social optimum problem de¯ning a constrained Pareto optimum can be expressed as a principal-agent problem, with the planner acting as a \benevolent" principal.
The idea that¯nancial decisions of agents transmit information about characteristics or actions of agents that are not directly observable or knowable by the market, has been extensively explored in the¯nance literature. Concepts of equilibrium based on this idea and the idea of rational expectations have been used in many partial equilibrium models: for adverse selection in the signaling models of Ross (1977) , and Leland and Pyle (1977) , and the subsequent literature (see Harris and Raviv (1992) for a survey); for problems of moral hazard by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Grossman and Hart (1982) , and Brander and Spencer (1989) . This paper di®ers from these latter contributions in that it makes explicit in a general equilibrium setting with moral hazard how the market can resolve (or at least mitigate) the incentive problems created by asymmetry of information; it also provides a framework in which the risk-sharing function of¯nancial markets and their disciplining role in attenuating the agency costs of¯rms can be studied simultaneously. This permits the agency costs and bene¯ts of equity and debt to be balanced against the risk-sharing bene¯ts and costs of these securities.
A simpler concept of rational expectations is present in all the literature on general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI) which began with the papers of Arrow (1953) and Diamond (1967) , and subsequently gave rise to an extensive literature (for a survey of results in this area see Magill and Shafer (1991) GEI models. Since the problem of constrained ine±ciency arising in an incomplete markets model with many goods or many periods, or in a production economy without partial spanning, is not directly related to the problems posed by incentives, we have chosen to take as a benchmark the simplest model of a production economy in which¯nancial markets lead to constrained e±ciency in the absence of incentive e®ects.
An alternative approach to incorporating asymmetric information into general equilibrium, which is tantamount to extending Arrow-Debreu theory directly to a world with moral hazard and adverse selection has been proposed by Townsend (1984a, 1984b) . The contracts they consider are lotteries on an abstract consumption space. For the moment it is not clear to us how the two approaches are related: the contracts they study seem very di®erent from the standard debt and equity contracts which are the focus of our analysis.
More recently a number of papers have studied how moral hazard within the¯rm a®ects the pricing of its equity contract (Kahn (1990) , Kocherlakota (1995) , Shorish and Spear (1996) ): these are representative agent models modi¯ed to incorporate the e®ect of unobservable e®ort on production. The¯ndings of Kocherlakota are similar in spirit to those of Section 4 | namely that, when trades are observable, moral hazard does not help to solve the equity premium puzzle.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of a stock market economy with moral hazard and introduces the concept of an RCPP equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes it normative properties, while Section 4 presents examples of RCPP equilibria, contrasting them with the equilibria of a standard¯nance model.
Stock Market Equilibrium
The Model. Consider a two-period model of an economy with production, in which there is one good (income), and in which an investment of capital and e®ort at date 0 gives rise to an uncertain income stream at date 1, the uncertainty being modelled by states of nature (s = 1; : : : ; S). There are I agents: each agent i has an initial wealth w i 0 at date 0 and if agent i is an entrepreneur, by investing capital (an amount of the good (income)) and e®ort e i at date 0 he can obtain the uncertain stream of income at date 1 given by
where
is an increasing function of (z i ; e i ) on j R 2 + . When agent i is an investor, we set F
i´0
.
Each agent has a utility function U i where U i (x i ; e i ) is the utility associated with the consumption stream x i = (x i 0 ; x i 1 ; : : : ; x i S ) and the e®ort level e i . U i , which is de¯ned on the domain j R
S+1
+ £ j R + , is increasing in x i and decreasing in e i . Since the e®ort e i of an investor is not productive, it will always be set equal to zero. Each agent is thus characterized by (U i ; w i 0 ; F i ) and we let E(U; w 0 ; F ) denote the resulting economy with characteristics U = (U 1 ; : : : ; U I ), w 0 = (w 1 0 ; : : : ; w I 0 ), F = (F 1 ; : : : ; F I ).
The characteristics of the economy E(U ; w 0 ; F ) satisfy the following additional assumptions.
Agents' utility functions are separable
where the functions u i 0 ; u i 1 are strictly concave increasing, and c i is convex increasing. These functions are di®erentiable on their domains and satisfy the boundary conditions 4
In short, consumption is essential in all states and e®ort is essentially costless for small levels of e®ort.
On the production side, we assume that the production functions have the multiplicative form
the function f i expressing the speci¯c ability of agent i for transforming an initial investment of capital and e®ort (z i ; e i ) into a pro¯t stream at date 1. To permit the same notation to be used for both investors and entrepreneurs, we adopt the convention that´i´0 if agent i is an investor. f i (z i ; e i ) is assumed to be a di®erentiable, increasing function of (z i ; e i ) which satis¯es f i (0; e i ) = f i (z i ; 0) = 0 (both inputs are essential). While f i is concave in z i re°ecting decreasing returns to capital, concavity in e i is not needed as long as the marginal cost of e®ort increases faster than its marginal product (see Assumption MCMP(a) below).
The multiplicative factor structure 5 in (1) was¯rst introduced by Diamond (1967) . Its principal advantage is that it leads to a competitive pricing of the¯rms' risks which is well-de¯ned even if the¯nancial markets are incomplete. By altering his actions (z i ; e i ), entrepreneur i can in°uence the expected value of the pro¯t stream of his¯rm, but he cannot in°uence the risk pro¯le´i of the income stream that he sells, and thus the "risk price" of this basic income stream. More general risk structures for the production functions F i woulf require more markets than the basic debtequity markets to ensure that an entrepreneur has no in°uence on the structure of the¯nancial markets. We leave this case for further analysis and adopt here the simplest framework in which the assumption of competitive pricing of risks is appropriate, concentrating on the new element introduced by incentives.
We accept as a fact that the complexity of business risks, when combined with the unobservability of entrepreneurial e®ort, makes the writing and enforcement of contracts contingent on states unfeasible. The opportunities for sharing the production risks in the economy are those that can be obtained through shared ownership of the¯rms. There is thus a stock market on which entrepreneurs, who have the initial property rights to the pro¯t streams of their¯rms (since this is the result of their e®ort and initiative) can sell a part of their ownership shares to obtain funds for capital investment, and can buy shares in other¯rms in order to diversify their risks. We assume that after selling ownership shares of their¯rms, entrepreneurs remain the sole managers of their rms even though they hold less than 100% of the shares: they are thus \owner-managers" in the sense of Jensen-Meckling (1976) . In addition to obtaining funds by issuing equity,¯rms can also issue debt. To simplify the analysis the penalty for bankruptcy is assumed to be in¯nite: there is thus a single instrument traded on the bond market, which is the \default-free" bond.
To make clear how the timing of agents decisions takes place, date 0 is divided into two subperiods 0 1 ; 0 2 . In subperiod 0 1 entrepreneurs use the¯nancial markets to obtain the capital required to set up their¯rms and to diversity their risks: in the second subperiod 0 2 , after the investment and¯nancing decisions have been made,¯rms become \operative" and entrepreneurs decide on the appropriate e®ort to invest in the running of their¯rms. At date 1 \nature" chooses a state of the world (shock): production takes place and pro¯t is realized.
In subperiod 0 1 entrepreneur i decides on the amount of capital z i to invest in his¯rm, on the
, on the share (1 ¡ µ i i ) of his¯rm to sell and on the shares µ i k of other¯rms k 6 = i to buy: let µ i = (µ i 1 ; : : : ; µ i I ) denote the agent's portfolio of equity contracts. Since we study the case in which¯nancial markets are still relatively simple (debt and equity only), we assume that there are no short sales 6 so that µ i 2 j R I + . Let q 0 denote the price of the bond and let Q = (Q 1 ; : : : ; Q I ) denote the vector of prices of the¯rms' shares: thus Q i is the price of full ownership of¯rm i, and if agent i is not an entrepreneur i.e. if F i (z i ; e i )´0, then
The accountability of agent i requires that the following budget equations be satis¯ed
the consumption in each state being non-negative. If x i 1 = (x i 1 ; : : : ; x i S ) denotes the date 1 consumption stream, and if 1 = (1; : : : ; 1) denotes the riskless income stream at date 1, then the S equations in (3) can be written in the more condensed vector form
The agents'¯nancial transactions (
carried out in subperiod 0 1 are assumed to be mutually observable. Thus an investor who spends money buying shares of¯rm i, knows exactly how this money is used by entrepreneur i: how much is invested in the¯rm (z i ), how much goes to private consumption (x i 0 ), etc : : : ; he also knows agent i's sources of income at date 1, his debt payment ¡b i , and the dividends he will receive from the di®erent¯rms in the economy. What the investor cannot observe when buying his shares in¯rm i is the e®ort entrepreneur i will invest in his¯rm: this decision will be made by the entrepreneur in subperiod 0 2 , and the best the investor can do is to form an expectation about what e i will be.
Optimal E®ort Function. Consider how entrepreneur i chooses his optimal e®ort in subperiod 0 2 . Given that this decision is made after the¯nancing decision (z i ; b i ; µ i ) has been chosen, the entrepreneur will choose the e®ort level e i which maximizes u i 1 (x i 1 ) ¡ c i (e i ), the date 1 consumption stream x i 1 being given by (4). If agent i correctly anticipates the e®ort of other entrepreneurs (k 6 = i), then he will correctly anticipate what his date 1 outside income stream m i will be, where
The agent's choice of e®ort is thus the solution of the problem
where the parameters (m i ; z i ;
for some e i¸0 : let D denote this domain.
is increasing and tends to 1 when e i ¡! 1.
(b) There is a smooth path e i : [0; 1] ¡! j R + with e i (0) = 0 and e i0 (t) > 0 such that
Assumption MCMP(a) ensures that the problem (E) has a unique solution, while MCPM(b)
ensures that each entrepreneur's technology is su±ciently productive relative to his cost of e®ort, to make it worthwhile to put his¯rm into operation: if the entrepreneur were to operate at (z i ; e i ) = (0; 0), there would be a way of slightly increasing capital (z i = t) and e®ort (e i = e i (t)) so that the increase in marginal utility arising from the increase in output exceeds the marginal increase in the cost of e®ort.
The higher the power ±, the°atter is the cost curve at zero, and the more readily MCMP is satis¯ed.
Proof (i) The¯rst-order condition for the problem (E) is given by
with equality if e i > 0. Since f i (z i ; ¢) is increasing, and
is decreasing by concavity of u i 1 , the RHS of (8) is a decreasing function of e i , while LHS is increasing. If at e i = 0, LHS exceeds RHS then e i = 0 is the solution: in the opposite case, since LHS goes to 1 there is a unique e i > 0 satisfying (8) with equality, and the di®erentiability of this solution follows by applying the Implicit Function Theorem, noting that the hypothesis of Proposition 2 implies c i00 =c i0 >
(ii) Let ¢U i denote the di®erence in utility in (7) between investing (z i ; e i (z i )) in activity i and investing (0; 0), where e i (¢) is the function de¯ned in MCMP(b) and z i • min fx i 0 =2; 1g. Then
@f @e i > 0, e i0 > 0 and u i 0 and u i 1 are concave
By MCMP(b), for z i > 0 su±ciently small this expression is positive. 4
Note that by (5), the entrepreneur's outside income m i is a function of his borrowing and of his equity shares in other¯rms (b i ; (µ i k ) k6 =i ), so that his optimal e®ort is well-de¯ned once he has chosen his¯nancial variables. We may thus use either the notation e e i (m i ; z i ; µ i i ) as in (6) or e e i (z i ; b i ; µ i )
to denote an entrepreneur's optimal e®ort function.
Stock Market Equilibrium. Consider an investor who is thinking of buying shares of entrepreneur i's¯rm and can observe his¯nancial decisions (z i ; b i ; µ i ). It would be \irrational" for the investor not to use this information to deduce what the most likely e®ort of entrepreneur i will be. To be able to deduce e e i (z i ; b i ; µ i ), however, the investor would need to know in addition to the entrepreneurs¯nancial decisions, his characteristics (u i 1 ; c i ; f i ;´i). In the analysis that follows we make the strong assumption that the agents' characteristics are common knowledge. Thus the investor can deduce from the¯nancial variables (z i ; b i ; µ i ) the e®ort that entrepreneur i will choose:
in short, we suppose that every investor knows the entrepreneur's e®ort function e e i (z i ; b i ; µ i ). In practice agents will probably not have such a precise knowledge of other agents' characteristics | however they are likely to have a good idea of \what makes entrepreneurs tick". Experienced investors are not readily fooled: they are likely to predict that an entrepreneur who retains only a small share of his¯rm and has a lot of outside income will not exert much e®ort to make his¯rm productive.
If investors correctly anticipate, through the price they are prepared to pay for each¯rm i, the e®ect of the¯nancial decisions of entrepreneur i on the e®ort that he invests in his¯rm, then it seems reasonable to suppose that each entrepreneur will come to understand this. Hence our second assumption: entrepreneurs know that investors will use their¯nancial decisions as \signals" of the e®ort that they will exert in their¯rms. The next step is to incorporate these two assumptions into a concept of equilibrium.
The description of an equilibrium consists of two parts. The¯rst is the standard part which enumerates the actions of the I agents, the prices of the I +1 securities and the mutual compatibility of their actions under these prices. The second part describes the entrepreneurs' perceptions of the way their¯nancial decisions a®ect the price that the \market" will pay for the shares of their¯rms, and ensures that these perceptions are compatible with the equilibrium prices. Let 
Definition 1: A stock market equilibrium with price perceptions e Q is a triple
consisting of actions, prices and price perceptions such that (i) for each agent i; (¹ x i ; ¹ e i ) maximizes U i (x i ; e i ) among consumption-e®ort streams such that 7
Thus in an equilibrium with price perceptions e Q, each entrepreneur takes the prices and production plans of the other entrepreneurs as given, and correctly anticipates the e®ort they invest in 7 Whenever k is not an entrepreneur, since F k (z k ; e k )´0, the shares µ However, this is not a legitimate use of the assumption of price-taking behavior, since Q i is not a \per-unit" price, but rather is the price of the whole¯rm. Competition means that agents take per-unit prices as given, independent of the amount that they supply to the market. The \good"
sold by entrepreneur i to investors is the risk pro¯le´i that they can use for taking or diversifying risks, and we assume that entrepreneur i takes its price as given. The notion of competition does not however explain how an entrepreneur should perceive that the \market" will evaluate the personalized part f i (z i ; e i ), namely the \amount" of´i that we will supply when e i is not observable.
To answer this part, the concept of rational expectations is more appropriate than the concept of competition. We are thus led to the following concept of equilibrium.
Definition 2: A stock market equilibrium with rational, competitive price perceptions (RCPP)
is an equilibrium ((¹ x; ¹ e; ¹ b; ¹ µ); (¹ q 0 ; ¹ Q; e Q) with price perceptions in which the perception functions satisfy the following condition: there exist prices (¹ q 1 ; : : : ; ¹ q I ) for the¯rms' basic income streamś i ; i = 1; : : : ; I such that for i = 1; : : : ; I (9)
Thus to check if his¯nancial decision (¹ z i ; ¹ b i ; ¹ µ i ) at equilibrium is optimal, entrepreneur i forms expectations about what the price e Q i would be if he were to make an alternative¯nancial decision (z i ; b i ; µ i ). To form these expectations he takes the price ¹ q i of one unit of his income stream´i as given 8 , and calculates that the market price of his¯rm will be t i ¹ q i , if the market anticipates his pro¯t will be t i´i . To evaluate m i in (10) he takes as given the e®ort ¹ e k that other entrepreneurs
. This is the competitive part of his calculation.
To evaluate what the market anticipates his \output" t i will be, he draws on his knowledge of investor rationality: he anticipates that the market will deduce from (m i ; z i ; µ i i ) what his optimal e®ort will be, and thus anticipates that t i will be equal to f i (z i ; e e i (m i ; z i ; µ i i )). This is the rational expectations part of his calculation.
An RCPP equilibrium describes a situation where entrepreneurial e®ort is not observable, but where all participants on the market use all available information to deduce the likely values of the hidden (moral hazard) variables | and all agents know this: in short, there is common knowledge of rationality.
Constrained E±ciency
A well-known result of Diamond (1967) asserts that in a model similar to the one considered in this paper, but in which there are no incentive e®ects, the stock market leads to e±cient investment and risk sharing, the e±ciency being relative to the existing structure of securities | in short, he proved that a stock market equilibrium is constrained e±cient. When the¯rms' pro¯t functions f i (z i ; e i ) are independent of e i , so that the e®ort variables are omitted, the model we are studying reduces to Diamond's model of the stock market. Does the constrained e±ciency result carry over to the more general version of the model in which entrepreneurs' incentives are explicitly taken into account? Since the stock market cannot achieve risk sharing without distorting incentives, the question arises whether this trade-o® is achieved in an optimal way at an equilibrium. In their attempt to diversify their risks, do outside shareholders acquire excessively large holdings in thē rms, leading to undue distortion of the entrepreneurs' incentives to invest e®ort in their¯rms? Or, on the contrary, are the entrepreneurs unduly reluctant to sacri¯ce ownership shares in their pro¯t streams, thus robbing other agents of potential opportunities for risk sharing? To answer these questions we need to generalize the concept of constrained e±ciency introduced by Diamond to the 8 Note that the \competitive" price ¹ qi can be deduced from the observable market prices ¹ Qi, only if the¯rm of entrepreneur i is active. For if f i (¹ z i ; ¹ e i ) > 0 then (ii) in De¯nition 1 and (9) imply that ¹ qi = ¹ Qi=f i (¹ z i ; ¹ e i ). However if
; ¹ e i ) = 0, then (ii) and (9) imply ¹ Q i = 0, so that ¹ q i is indeterminate. In this latter case, the concept of equilibrium does not guarantee that the price ¹ qi used by entrepreneur i to reach the decision (¹ z i ; ¹ e i ) = 0 is \reasonable", since it does not correspond to an objective market signal. Assumption MCMP(b) avoids the conceptual di±culties that arise in these cases.
context of this model. This means introducing a concept of constrained feasible allocations, which respects the limited trading opportunities achievable by a system of bond and equity markets, and in addition respects the incentive constraints imposed by the nonobservability of e®ort. Applying the Pareto ranking criterion to this constrained feasible set leads to the concept of a constrained Pareto optimum.
Definition 3: An allocation (x; e) = (x i ; e i ) I i=1 is constrained feasible if there exist inputs and portfolios (z;
and for each agent i = 1; : : : ; I (14)
An allocation (x; e) is constrained Pareto optimal (CPO), if it is constrained feasible, and if there does not exist any alternative constrained feasible allocation (b x; b e) such that U i (b x i ; b e i )U i (x i ; e i ); i = 1; : : : ; I with strict equality for at least one i.
Constrained E±ciency of Stock Market.
We can think of a CPO allocation as being achieved by a \planner" who chooses the variables which, in equilibrium, are determined by trade on markets, with the objective of maximizing social welfare. Here the planner chooses the variables 9 (x i 0 ; z i ; b i ; µ i ). The implicit assumption which limits the planners instruments to (x i 0 ; z i ; b i ; µ i ) is that he cannot remove the observational constraints of the model, which limit the instruments 9 In order to express the fact that the planner replaces \markets", he must not have to worry about prices or respecting agents' budget constraints and thus has to be able to choose the date 0 consumption x i 0 of agents directly, subject only to the aggregate feasibility constraint (11).
for risk sharing and make entrepreneurs' e®ort impossible to control directly: in particular, the planner has to respect the fact that entrepreneurs will personally choose their e®ort levels based on the incentives created by his choice of investment-portfolio variables (z i ; b i ; µ i ). Proving that an equilibrium is CPO thus amounts to showing that, given the observational constraints of the model, there is no way of improving the trade-o® between risk sharing and incentives that results from decentralized trade on the markets. In short, even if a \planner" replaces \markets", he cannot improve on the allocation.
Proposition 2: If E(u; w 0 ; F ) is an economy satisfying the assumptions of Section 2, then every RCPP equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal.
Proof: If the equilibrium ((¹ x; ¹ e; ¹ z;
is not CPO, then there is a constrained feasible allocation (x; e; z; b; µ) satisfying (11)- (15) 
would have been available to agent i, (when he in fact chose the equilibrium consumption ¹ x i 1 ), had he chosen the investment, debt and ownership in his own¯rm (z i ; b i ; µ i i ), and the portfolio of shares in other¯rms ( e µ i k ) k6 =i given by
Given the outside income m i derived from debt and other¯rms' securities, by constrained optimality, his choice of e®ort e i = e e i (m i ; z i ; µ i i ) would then have been optimal. Since (x i ; e i ) is preferred or indi®erent for all agents and strictly preferred by at least one agent, the date 0 consumption must be at least as expensive, and strictly more for some agent: thus (16) x
: : : ; I with strict inequality for some i. Note that by (9), and (ii) in De¯nition 1
Summing (16) over i, using (17) and (18) gives
By feasibility
µ k i = 1; i = 1; : : : ; I. But then (19) implies
z i , contradicting the constrained feasibility of (x; e; z; b; µ). 4
The standard framework for studying the optimal trade-o® between risk sharing and incentives is the setting of a principal-agent problem. It is thus of some interest to note that the planner's problem of¯nding a CPO can be expressed as a generalized principal-agent problem. A principal (the planner), who can be thought of as owning all the resources, looks for a way of rewarding agents in the economy through the choice of consumption, investment and portfolio variables, so as to maximize a weighted sum of the agents' utilities under constraints which limit the risk-sharing possibilities at date 1 (constraints (14)), the incentive constraints (15), and subject to a reservation level of utility for himself equal to zero. This latter constraint can be expressed as the fact that the principal appropriates no resources of the economy for himself, and is thus equivalent to the resource availability constraints (11)-(13). If the principal wanted to decentralize the solution to his social welfare problem by providing agents with incentive contracts, then he would have to solve the following contract design problem:¯nd functions Á i : j R + £ j R £ j R I + ¡! j R such that a Nash equilibrium of the game with strategies (z i ; b i ; µ i ; e i ) for the agents (i = 1; : : : ; I) and payo®s V i (z; b; µ; e) where
is a CPO allocation. Proposition 2 asserts that the market provides a solution to this contract design problem given by
where (¹ q 0 ; ¹ Q; e Q) are the prices and price perceptions of an RCPP equilibrium of the economy E(U; ! 0 ; F ). Note that the contracts Á i are linear for investors and nonlinear for entrepreneurs.
To obtain an intuitive understanding for the way in which the market solves the contract design problem, it is useful to compare the¯rst-order conditions for constrained optimality with the¯rst-order conditions in an RCPP equilibrium.
First-Order Conditions for CPO. In view of the boundary assumptions on the utility functions and assumption MCMP, at a CPO all the variables x i are positive and, for entrepreneurs, the variables (z i ; e i ) are also positive. The only non-negativity constraints which need to be taken into account in deriving the¯rst-order conditions (FOC) are the no-short-sales constraints µ i k¸0 . The FOC are more convenient to derive if the variables (x; e; z; b; µ) are replaced by the variables
here the relation between the two sets of variables is given by
The new variables (¹ i k ) k6 =i re°ect the fact that the production of¯rm k a®ects agent i only in so far as it a®ects his outside income m i . In these new variables an allocation (x; e) is constrained
and for each agent i = 1; : : : ; I
A constrained Pareto optimal allocation is a solution of the problem 
where r m i e e i is the vector of partial derivatives (the gradient) of the e®ort function e e i (m i ; z i ; µ i i ) with respect to m i = (m i 1 ; : : : ; m i S ) and where (29) holds with equality if ¹ i k > 0. To these equations should be added the FOC for the choice of optimal e®ort by entrepreneur i
This is just the marginal way of expressing the incentive constraint e i = e e i (¢) in (24). Dividing this equation by u i0 0 to make it comparable with (25) -(30), gives
The¯rst-order conditions with respect to the variables (x i ; ¹ i k ) of an investor are (25) and
Economic Interpretation of FOC. Equation (25) de¯nes the present-value vector ¼ i = (¼ i 1 ; : : : ; ¼ i S ) of agent i: for any date 1 income stream v = (v 1 ; : : : ; v S ), ¼ i ¢ v is the present value to agent i of the income stream v. The variables (q 0 ; q 1 ; : : : ; q I ) are the social values (shadow prices) of the income streams (securities) (1;´1; : : : ;´i). ² i , which is the social cost of the incentive constraint (24), is the social value of (one unit of ) e®ort by agent i. The equations (28) - (30) and (28 0 ) -(29 0 ), i.e. thē rst-order conditions with respect to (b i ; ¹ i k ; µ i i ), express the limited sense in which there must be equalization of marginal rates of substitution to achieve a CPO allocation, full equalization being prevented by the fact that income can only be distributed indirectly using securities, and that the incentive constraints of the agents must be satis¯ed.
For each security, 1 or´k, the private bene¯t to agent i of an additional (marginal) unit of the security is ¼ i ¢ 1 or ¼ i ¢´k. If agent i is an investor, then the private bene¯t coincides with the social bene¯t and (28 0 ) and (29 0 ) express the equalization of social (marginal) bene¯t and social (marginal) cost | these are the standard FOC for an optimal portfolio problem. Suppose now that agent i is an entrepreneur and i 6 = k. An additional unit of security 1 or´k creates more than just a direct marginal bene¯t: since the agent is an entrepreneur, an increase in his outside income has an indirect e®ect | for it changes his e®ort by ¢e i = r m i e e i ¢ 1 or r m i e e i ¢´k, and since this e®ort has a social value ² i , the social value of this indirect e®ect is ² i ¢e i . If i = k, in order for agent i to receive an additional unit of the security of his own¯rm, his holding µ i i f i (z i ; e i ) must increase by one unit: this is equivalent to increasing µ i i by 1 f i . This increase in the shareholding of his own rm increases 10 his e®ort by
Thus (28)- (30) express equalization at the margin of the social cost and the social bene¯t of allocating an additional unit of 1;´k or´i to entrepreneur i where the social bene¯t is equal to the private bene¯t to the entrepreneur minus the indirect social cost of his changed e®ort.
The social value ² i of an additional unit of e®ort by entrepreneur i is de¯ned by equation (26) which can be written as
, namely the bene¯t to entrepreneur i plus the bene¯t to \outside investors" who receive the share (1 ¡ µ i i ) of his output, and the social marginal cost, which here coincides with the private cost c i0 =u i0 0 , since entrepreneur i is the only one to bear the cost of his e®ort. Since e®ort is chosen optimally by entrepreneur i, by the \envelope theorem", or more precisely by the FOC (31), the welfare e®ect on the entrepreneur of a marginal change in his e®ort is zero. Substituting (31) into (26 0 ) gives
In the text we take the most intuitive case where @e e i =@µ i i > 0 i.e. increased ownership leads to increased e®ort. It can happen, when b i is su±ciently large, that income e®ects make this term negative (see Section 4).
The social value of an additional unit of e®ort by entrepreneur i is the value to agents other than himself of the additional output that this e®ort would create 11 : thus ² i > 0 (= 0) if and only if µ i i < 1 (= 1). When µ i i < 1 the e®ort of entrepreneur i a®ects all those agents j who obtain a share of his pro¯t stream: there is thus an external e®ect. The incentive constraint implies that this external e®ect is not taken into account when agent i makes his e®ort decision and this creates a cost ² i , which is the cost of separating ownership and control. This cost is however explicitly taken into account by the planner when he chooses (z i ; b i ; µ i ).
The logic underlying the FOC (27) for the socially optimal investment in¯rm i should now be clear: the social cost of one unit of investment at date 0 must equal the direct social bene¯t (thē rst term on RHS of (27)) plus the indirect social bene¯t ¡ ² i @e e i =@z i ¢ from the increased e®ort by agent i induced by this increment to the capital input of his¯rm.
How the FOC for CPO are Achieved at Equilibrium. Since a stock market equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal, entrepreneurs must | just like the planner in a CPO problem | be induced to take into account the external e®ect of their e®ort on the welfare of others, namely the terms in ² i in equations (26)- (30). In the standard model of competitive equilibrium, where prices are assumed to be independent of the quantities chosen, the price system cannot cope e±ciently with externalities. However, in an RCPP equilibrium, there is a \non-competitive" part, namely the rational-anticipations component of the perception function e Q: while entrepreneurs take the prices (q i ) I i of the factors´i as given, they recognize that the price that the market will pay for their shares depends on investors' expectations of the e®ort that they will make. Since investors can deduce from the entrepreneurs'¯nancial decisions what their e®ort will be,¯nancial decisions end up playing the role of signals: in the process of choosing their \signals", entrepreneurs are led to internalize the externality.
The way in which the price perceptions force entrepreneurs to internalize the externality, can be clearly understood by matching the FOC at an equilibrium with the FOC for a CPO allocation.
Consider the maximum problem of an entrepreneur in a stock market equilibrium ((i) is the present-value vector of agent i at the equilibrium. The¯rst-order conditions are
By paying attention to the way potential shareholders react to his¯nancial decisions (z i ; b i ; µ i ), through the partial derivatives (@ e Q i =@z i , etc : : : ), entrepreneur i is led to take their interests into account. With the rational, competitive price perceptions e Q i de¯ned by (9), these partial derivatives are given by
Substituting (39) - (42) into (33) - (38), and setting
@e i for i = 1; : : : ; I, gives the FOC (25)-(31) for a constrained Pareto optimal allocation.
In letting himself be guided by the price perceptions e Q i (z i ; b i ; µ i ), an entrepreneur understands, for example, that if he doubles the share (1 ¡ µ i i ) of his¯rm that he sells, this will not double the income he receives: for shareholders know that when his ownership share falls, the e®ort that the entrepreneur will invest in his¯rm will fall, and this is re°ected in the smaller price e Q i that shareholders will pay for the shares. He also knows that if he uses the proceeds of the sale for personal consumption or to buy shares in other¯rms, he will get less than if he uses the proceeds to¯nance capital expenditure for the¯rm.
There is an interesting connection between Proposition 2 and the conditions for constrained (second best) optimality in an insurance market with moral hazard (Hellwig (1983) , Henriet-Rochet (1991) , Lisboa (1996) ). In the insurance models, nonlinear prices are needed to obtain constrained optimality, and in such models the insurance companies are the natural intermediaries for implementing such \second-best optimal" nonlinear pricing. In the stock market, price perceptions induce nonlinear prices: thus rational behavior and anticipation on the part of agents can act as an alternative mechanism for achieving constrained e±ciency to having intermediaries that charge explicit nonlinear prices. 12
Qualitative Properties of Stock Market Equilibria
In this section we examine how equilibria with incentives di®er from the familiar¯nancial market equilibria based on risk sharing. The results which are summarized in Tables 1-4 show two types of equilibria for economies with the following characteristics: there are three (types of) agents, two entrepreneurs (agents 1 and 2) and one investor (agent 3); there are three states of nature of equal probability, and agents have additively separable utility functions
; a 1 = a 2 = 0; a 3 = 50; ± i = 0:9; c i (e) =¯e°;¯= 1:8;°= 2
Thus the utility functions for date 1 consumption are expected discounted utility, with v i taken from the LRT (linear risk tolerance) family 13 . All agents have the same coe±cient of marginal risk tolerance (equal to 2) and agent 3, with a negative intercept, is less risk tolerant than the others.
The entrepreneurs' production possibilities are given by 12 In practice the underwriters who undertake to°oat an issue of shares on behalf of a¯rm help to make clear to the company how the market is going to evaluate their issue of shares. From the perspective of our model, in addition to matching supply and demand, their role is to help \entrepreneurs" to form rational, competitive price perceptions. 13 For an expected utility function E(v(x)), the risk tolerance is de¯ned by T (x) = ¡v 0 (x)=v 00 (x). The function v is in the LRT family if T (x) = A + Bx. A is the intercept and B is the coe±cient of marginal risk tolerance. Here A1 = A2 = 0; A3 = ¡100 and Bi = 2 for all agents.
Thus activity 1 with mean E(´1) = 15 and standard deviation ¾(´1) = 5:7 is less productive, but less risky, than activity 2, for which E(´2) = 18 and ¾(´2) = 8:6. The two activities are positively correlated with correlation coe±cient cor(´1;´2) = 0:76. The economy has a¯xed date 0 wealth: w 1 0 + w 2 0 + w 3 0 = 400. We consider two distributions of initial wealth between entrepreneurs and investors given by (80; 80; 240) and (20; 20; 360) To show how the incentive e®ects change the predictions of the model with respect to risk sharing, security prices, and the use of debt versus equity, when compared with the standard CAPMlike model of¯nance, we compute two types of equilibria. First, the RCPP stock market equilibrium (Tables 1 and 3) ; second, the risk sharing equilibrium of the associated¯nance economy in which rms have the same physical investment and output (z i ; y i ) as in the RCPP equilibrium, but where the production plans are taken as¯xed and independent of the consumption-portfolio choices of the agents. The consumption-portfolio choices and security prices of this latter equilibrium are those that would be predicted by an outside observer knowing the agents' risk-impatience characteristics and the¯rms' production plans, but who is not aware of the feedback between the entrepreneurs' nancial decisions and their choices of e®ort. Since we have chosen utility functions in the LRT family and since there are well-known properties for the equilibria of a¯nance economy with such preferences, we call this latter type of equilibrium an LRT equilibrium (Tables 2 and 4) .
Comparing RCPP and LRT Equilibria. The main di®erence between the two types of equilibria lies in the capital structure of the¯rms. An LRT equilibrium is a classical risk sharing equilibrium, and by a well-known result in the¯nance literature 14 , in such an equilibrium agents have fully diversi¯ed portfolios, µ i 1 =µ i 2 = 1; i = 1; 2; 3 (see Tables 2 and 4 ). By contrast, in an RCPP equilibrium (Tables 1 and 3 ) because entrepreneurs know that retaining an increased ownership share implies an increased equity price, and because increasing debt has the same e®ect, the incentive e®ects induce entrepreneurs to retain a higher proportion of their¯rm than in an LRT equilibrium: as a result, entrepreneurs typically make more use of debt to¯nance their capital investment in an RCPP equilibrum than in an LRT equilibirum.
The qualitative di®erence in capital structure in the two types of equilibria translates into a qualitative di®erence in the prices of the securities or equivalently their rates of return (as shown in the last row of Tables 1-4). If r denotes the rate of interest and if r i ¡ r is the risk premium on the equity of¯rm i, where 1 + r = 1 q 0 ; 1 + r i = E(y i ) Q i ; i = 1; 2 and y i = (y i 1 ; : : : ; y i S ) is the date 1 pro¯t stream of¯rm i, then the rate of interest is higher and the risk premia on securities are lower in an RCPP equilibrium than in an LRT equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs, by restricting the supply of their¯rms' shares that they o®er for sale, drive up the prices of equity contracts, thus lowering their risk premia 15 . The entrepreneurs who need outside funds to¯nance their capital investment resort to increased borrowing, thereby increasing the rate of interest.
The di®erence between the incentive e®ects of equity and debt can be seen by comparing the RCPP equilibria in Tables 1 and 3 . The reduced initial wealth of entrepreneurs in the latter equilibrium forces them to draw more extensively on outside sources of funds, their capital investment in the two equilibria being essentially unchanged: were they to raise funds exclusively by selling shares in their¯rms, the negative e®ect on incentives would lead to a fall in output and to a fall in the price of their shares. To avoid this decrease in the price of their equity, entrepreneurs increase their reliance on debt: incurring debt counterbalances the e®ect of selling equity, since increasing debt has a positive e®ect on incentives 16 , leading to a higher output and higher equity prices. In the equilibrium of Table 3 the e®ect of increasing debt dominates the e®ect of selling equity, so that e®ort and output increase (by about 15%).
Qualitative Properties of E®ort Function. The way in which ownership and debt jointly in°uence e®ort is shown in Figure 1 . Entrepreneur 2's capital investment and his ownership share of¯rm 1 have been set at the equilibrium values in Table 1 (¹ z 2 = 85; ¹ µ 2 1 = 0) so that his optimal e®ort can be expressed as a function of his ownership share µ 2 2 and his debt b 2 e 2 = h 2 (µ 102, 87, 72, 57, 37, 22, 7, -8, -93, -393. so that up to a monotone transformation of the vertical axis, the same graph illustrates the perception function e Q 2 (b 2 ; µ 2 2 ). Thus the general qualitative properties of the way e®ort responds to debt and ownership share translate into equivalent properties for the perception function e Q 2 (b 2 ; µ 2 2 ). In particular selling equity can always be achieved without a drop in the price, provided debt is incurred at the same time.
Conclusion
With the exception of the well-known papers of Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b) , general equilibrium theory and the economics of asymmetric information are two branches of economic theory which have remained surprisingly separate. With some exaggeration general equilibrium studies circumstances under which markets \work", while the theory of asymmetric information reveals the circumstances which make markets \fail". Prescott and Townsend argue that in principle markets can resolve problems posed by asymmetry of information: however, to establish this result, they postulate the existence of an extensive array of markets for contracts (which rather like ArrowDebreu contracts) are di±cult to identify in the real world.
The approach of this paper is somewhat di®erent: it seeks to formalize in a general equilibrium setting why the markets that we actually observe for debt and equity may perform rather well even in the presence of moral hazard. The main requirement, in addition to perfect competition, is that participants on these markets be rational, and that this rationality be common knowledge. This is formalized in the concept of rational, competitive price perceptions: it is the anticipatory aspect of perceptions which provides the disciplinary forces that induce agents to act in the appropriate way.
